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RECENT
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A REVIEW OF NEW CASES, 
LEGISLATION, & REGULATIONS AFFECTING 
THE NATURAL RESOURCES INDUSTRIES
Thomas A. Daily
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS—A REVIEW OF CASES, LEGISLATION, AND
REGULATIONS AFFECTING THE NATURAL RESOURCES INDUSTRIES
By Thomas A. Daily1
El ev en th  Circ u it  Ru les  that  EPA Must  Reg ul at e  Fra c  Tr ea tm en ts .
The Safe Water Drinking Act (“SWDA”)2 requires the Environmental Protection Agency to 
promulgate regulations that set forth minimum requirements for state administered programs 
regulating underground injection o f fluids. Among those minimum requirements is the requirement 
that the state must prohibit “any underground injection” unless authorized by permit or rule. EPA 
had previously ruled, however, that hydraulic fracturing o f oil and gas wells did not constitute 
“underground injection o f fluids” within the meaning o f SWDA.
Relying upon this EPA determination, Alabama submitted an underground injection control 
program which did not deal with hydraulic fracturing. Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation, 
Inc. (“LEAF’) petitioned EPA to withdraw its approval o f Alabama’s program because that program 
did not regulate hydraulic fracturing o f certain methane gas wells. EPA, consistent with its prior 
definition o f “underground injection,” denied LEAF’S petition.
LEAF then perfected a direct appeal to the United States Court o f Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit.3 The Court of Appeals ordered EPA to grant LEAF’S petition and withdraw its approval of 
Alabama’s underground injection control program. The appeals court found that the phrase “any 
underground injection” was unambiguous, and that EPA was without authority to make an exception,
1M ember, Daily & Woods, P.L.L.C., 623 Garrison, Suite 600, Fort Smith, AR 72901
242 U.S.C. §§300h-300h-8.
3Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation. Inc, v. EPA. 118 F.3d 1467 (11th Cir. 1997).
regardless of how much sense the exception might have made.
Presently this decision is only binding in the Eleventh Circuit, but, barring a rehearing in banc 
or appeal to the Supreme Court, it will stand. If EPA acquiesces in the decision EPA will begin 
requiring all states to regulate well completions which include hydraulic fracturing or acid treatments. 
The impact of all of this upon the natural resources industries cannot be accurately predicted at this 
time, but it can’t be good. Perhaps the best solution would be to persuade Congress to grant specific 
exemptions from SDWA for these de minimus injections, particularly when they occur thousands of 
feet below fresh water aquifers.
Te n t h  Circu it  Rules  th at  Fe de ra l  Reserva tion  o f  Co a l  in  La n d  
Paten t  o f  Indi a n  Triba l  La n ds  Rese rv ed  Co al be d  Me t ha ne
The Southern Ute Indian Tribe is the successor in interest to the United States under 
Colorado lands patented with reservation to the United States of “all coal.” These lands contain 
substantial production of coalbed methane gas. The Southern Ute Tribe sued Amoco and other 
producers for trespass, among other causes of action, for producing this gas without a lease from the 
Tribe. The producers had obtained leases from the owners of the oil and gas, as opposed to coal.
The case was certified as a class action defense, with Amoco acting as the designated class 
representative. The District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants.4 On appeal, the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.5 The Appeals Court appeared persuaded that since coalbed 
methane was produced by the coalification process, it is simply a gaseous form of coal and thus had 
to fall within the reservation of “all coal.” Also important was a rule of construction that reservations
4874 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Colo. 1995).
5Southem Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Co., 119 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 1997).
2
in favor of the Federal Government are to be broadly construed. This is contrary to the rule that 
reservations by private grantors are construed narrowly.
The limited authority on this interesting question when it involved private parties is split. 
Courts in Alabama6 and Pennsylvania7 have sided with the coal owner, while the Montana Court8 held 
for the gas owner. However, the Tenth Circuit Court expressed little interest in these cases, holding 
instead that the matter before it was one o f federal law.
This case is disturbing. In 1981, the Solicitor o f the Department o f the Interior had 
promulgated an opinion entitled Ownership o f and Right to Extract Coalbed Gas in Federal Coal 
Deposits9 in which the Solicitor construed the meaning of “coal” in the 1909 and 1910 Acts which 
enabled the patents and concluded that “a reservation of 'coal' does not include coalbed gas.”10 
Amoco and others had obviously relied upon this Solicitor's opinion in concluding that coalbed 
methane was the property o f the owner of the gas, rather than the coal owner. The Tenth Circuit 
Court concluded that the Solicitor's opinion was not binding because it was apparently issued without
6 NCNB Texas Nat’l Bank, N . A. v. West. 631 So. 2d 212 (Ala. 1993) (coal owner has 
ownership rights o f CBM contained in coal and gas owner has rights to any CBM which has 
migrated away from the coal reservoir); Vines v. McKenzie Methane Corp., 619 So. 2d 1305 
(Ala. 1993) (ownership o f CBM was included in grant o f “all coal”); Rayburn v. USX Corp., No. 
85-G-2661-W, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6920 (N.D. Ala. Jul. 28, 1987) (coal owner, USX, is 
owner o f right to explore for and to extract occluded CBM where grantor o f deed retained only 
oil and gas rights).
7United States Steel Corp. v. Hoge. 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983) (coal owner has right to
CBM)
8Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 898 P.2d 680 (Mont. 1995) (right to extract 
CBM is with holder o f gas exploration rights).
988 Interior Dec. 538 (1981).
10Id. at 549.
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notice to the tribes whose interests were affected. The real purpose of the Interior Solicitor's opinion 
was to enable the government to stake claim to coalbed methane under lands where the Government 
owned gas and someone else owned coal. Now, presumably, the government or the tribes may argue 
the issue either way, depending upon their interests in the particular case.
The lands in question underlay an Indian reservation in Colorado, so the problem seems 
remote. Unfortunately, it is not. Many very similar patents cover lands in Eastern Oklahoma where 
there has already been some coalbed methane production. Oklahoma is within the Tenth Circuit, so, 
presumably, those lands will be affected.
The Tenth Circuit Court o f Appeals recently granted a rehearing en banc in the case.
Arka nsa s  Supr eme  Co u r t  Aff irms  Cer ti fi cat ion  o f  Royal ty  
Ow n e r s ’ Sui t  Aga in st  SEECO a s  a  Cl as s  Ac ti o n .
SEECO, Inc. and Arkansas Western Gas Company are related corporate entities. Arkansas 
Western, a public utility, purchases gas from SEECO, a producer. One gas purchase contract 
between the parties is known as “Contract 59.” Alan Hales and others are royalty owners whose 
lands are dedicated to Contract 59. They brought suit against SEECO for allegedly failing to enforce 
the contract against Arkansas Western, particularly with respect to its take or pay provisions. The 
named plaintiffs sought to proceed as a class. The circuit judge certified the class of royalty owners 
and SEECO appealed.11
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's certification of the class. This result 
is unremarkable given the facts of the case. Indeed, Arkansas' most notorious take or pay case, Klein
11 SEECO, Inc. v. Hales. 330 Ark. 402 ,____ S.W .2d_____(1997).
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v. Arkoma Production Co.,12 was tried as a class action. However, the court's opinion contains a 
detailed recitation o f recent Arkansas decisions regarding class certification that attempts to reconcile 
apparently conflicting prior decisions and thus is likely to provide the basis for future decisions on 
class certification issues.
Thr ee  Ca se s  Invo lve  All eg ati ons  th a t  Centra l  Po in t  
Com pr ess or  Sta ti on s  Cons titute  Priv at e  Nu is a nc e .
During 1997, at least three cases were tried which involved noise emitted from central point 
compressor stations in North Arkansas. In Neel v. Synoground13 the issue was whether the 
Chancellor should rescind the sale o f a home and surrounding three acres because o f an alleged 
misrepresentation. The plaintiffs alleged that they were looking for a quiet home in the country and 
that Mrs. Synoground had represented to them that there was no noise problem of which she was 
aware. Also, the Synogrounds had answered “no” to the following question on a written property 
disclosure form used in connection with the transaction: “Are there any neighborhood noise problems 
or other nuisances that would not be normal for this type o f property?”
The plaintiffs testified that immediately after moving into the home they discovered an 
“unbearable” roaring noise. Upon investigation they found its source, a central point compressor 
station located about 1,500 feet from the home. The Chancellor visited the site three times, twice 
alone. He concluded that the noise level at the home constituted, at worst, “an almost imperceptible 
hum.” Thus, the complaint was dismissed with prejudice.
Three homeowners a few miles away who live quite close to another central point compressor
1273 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 1996).
13Sebastian County Chancery Court Case No. E-96-266-G (II) (Greenwood District).
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fared somewhat better in a jury trial in United States District Court.14 The case involved a site
containing two extremely large compressors which had been installed after the plaintiffs' homes had
been built. One plaintiff couple's home was only about 300 feet away from the site, while others were
somewhat farther away. The operator’s testimony was that it had spent thousands o f dollars muffling
the noise but that, because o f large fans required by the compressors, it was impossible to silence it
altogether. The jury held that the compressor station constituted a nuisance as to three plaintiff
couples. It awarded $55,000.00 to the couple living 300 feet away and $7,500.00 and $8,000.00,
respectively, to two other couples living about one-half mile away. The jury awarded no damages
to two other couples who live slightly farther away. No appeal was taken.
A jury returned a defense verdict in a case tried in Sebastian County Circuit Court which was
affirmed by the Arkansas Court o f Appeals in an unpublished opinion.15 The facts were very similar
to those in Cantrell v. Reynolds but the noise may not have been as great as at those plaintiffs' homes.
The jury instructions given in Cantrell v. Reynolds and Fitzgerald v. Southwestern Energy are
very similar. The material instructions given in Cantrell v. Reynolds are as follows:
Each o f the plaintiffs seek to recover damages from the defendant on the theory that 
the noise produced by defendant's compressor(s) constitutes a nuisance and that as 
a result o f the nuisance, the value o f their property has been permanently diminished.
In order to prove their case, each plaintiff has the burden o f proving each of the 
following three (3) essential propositions by a preponderance of the evidence:
First, that the compressor(s) operated by the defendant constitutes a nuisance;
14Cantrell. et al v. Reynolds Metals Company, U.S.D.C. Civil Case No. 96-2067 
(W.D.Ark).
15Roger Fitzgerald, et al v. Southwestern Energy Production Company, Case No. 
CA97-63 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997).
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Second, that the nuisance is permanent; and
Third, that the operation of the compressor(s) has resulted in a permanent diminution 
in the fair market value o f the plaintiffs' property.
W hether each o f these three (3) essential propositions has been proven by a 
preponderance o f the evidence is for you to determine.
An owner of an interest in land— including the lessee o f a mineral interest— may use 
the property as long as the use does not unlawfully or unreasonably interfere with 
others. It is only the unreasonable use or conduct which results in unwarranted 
interference that constitutes a nuisance.
You are instructed that, under Arkansas law, a nuisance is defined as conduct by one 
landowner, or lessee, which unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment o f the 
lands o f another. A nuisance includes conduct on property which disturbs the 
peaceful, quiet, and undisturbed use and enjoyment o f nearby property, but only 
where the resulting injury of nearby property and residents is certain, substantial, and 
beyond speculation and conjecture.
The mere diminution in value is not sufficient to establish a nuisance.
In determining whether any alleged nuisance is permanent in character, you should 
consider all o f the evidence, including but not limited to:
the nature o f the alleged nuisance;
the duration o f the alleged nuisance from its inception down to the 
present time;
whether the alleged nuisance is reasonably certain to continue and, if 
so, for how long.
An owner of an interest in land— including the lessee of a mineral interest— may use 
leased property so long as the use does not unlawfully or unreasonably interfere with 
others.
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You are instructed that the defendant is the lessee of the mineral interests underlying 
plaintiffs' property as well as the lessee o f other mineral interests in the Gragg Field 
area. Accordingly, as lessee, defendant has an interest in the land and has the right 
to use the property of the plaintiffs and others in any manner reasonably necessary to 
perform the obligations o f defendant's leases. This includes the right and obligation 
to explore, develop, and transport minerals under the land— including natural 
gas— and to construct and operate structures and facilities for the purpose o f 
producing and marketing gas, including construction and operation o f structures or 
facilities designed for the compression of natural gas.
Whether the defendant's operations unreasonably interfere with the use and enjoyment 
o f the lands of another is for you to decide.
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that the operation o f the 
compressor(s) constitutes a nuisance, and that the damage to the plaintiffs' property, 
if any, is permanent, then your verdict should be for an amount equal to the 
difference, if any, in the fair market value of plaintiffs' property immediately before 
and immediately after the commencement o f the operation of the compressor(s), to 
the extent such difference was proximately caused by the operation of said 
compressor(s).
When I use the expression “fair market value,” I mean the price that the plaintiffs' 
property would bring on the open market in a sale between a seller who is willing to 
sell and a buyer who is willing and able to buy after a reasonable opportunity for 
negotiations.
In determining the “fair market value” o f plaintiffs' property, you are to consider the 
highest and best use o f the land. However, the uses considered in fixing value must 
be so reasonably probable as to have an effect upon the market value o f the land.
8
AOGC and  PSC Disput e  Juri sd ic ti on  ov er  “Prod uc ti on ” Fa c i l i t i e s .
The Arkansas Natural Gas Pipeline Act of 197116 requires the Arkansas Public Service 
Commission (PSC) to regulate natural gas “gathering” in non-rural areas. Recently, the PSC's staff 
has adopted the position that such “gathering,” at least in some instances, includes pipelines located 
behind the meter which is at the point where custody o f the gas is transferred to a purchaser or 
transporter. Thus, PSC is now seeking to regulate activities of producers, in addition to transporters.
Producers argue that these upstream facilities are “production facilities” and exempt from PSC 
regulation. The Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission (AOGC) historically has thought it had 
jurisdiction over all phases of production of gas upstream from the transfer meter,17 although only as 
a result of PSC's assertion o f additional jurisdiction has AOGC sought to actively regulate pipelines 
and equipment used upstream from this meter.
On August 11, 1997, and August 13, 1997, PSC filed motions for show cause orders against 
Stephens Production Company18 and Sonat Exploration Company19 because, according to PSC, both 
were engaged in “gathering” gas pursuant to PSC jurisdiction. The facilities in question are pipelines 
connecting the wellheads o f various wells (several in the city limits of Fort Smith) to separators, 
dehydrators and compressors, as well as to the custody transfer meter.
After hearings before the PSC, PSC ordered the parties to request the United States 
Department o f Transportation (DOT) for an opinion as to whether DOT would consider PSC to
16A.C.A. §23-15-201-216.
17Pursuant to Act 105 o f 1939 (A.C.A. §15-71-101 et seq.).
18PSC docket No. 97-315-U.
19PSC docket No. 97-321-U.
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regulate such facilities in order to ensure DOT certification o f PSC's pipeline safety plan under 
Section 5 o f the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act o f 1968. DOT has yet to respond.
This is an important and complex issue. Significant growth o f Fort Smith and other Western 
Arkansas communities has caused the steady urban and suburban expansion into areas o f gas 
production. New discoveries o f gas have also recently been made in urban areas. Producers are 
concerned that overlapping agency jurisdiction will lead to unjustified red tape which will increase 
costs without benefits and, at worst, may lead to conflicting regulations. PSC appears proud o f its 
new “jurisdiction” and unwilling to give it up. The solution is probably legislative, but the next 
regular session isn't until 1999, and a special session is highly unlikely, given the mutual dislike 
between the Governor and the Legislature.
Brine  Case  Res olves  Limit atio ns  Iss ue ; Raises  Many  Ot h e r s .
Great Lakes Chemical Corporation20 produces Jurassic age salt water (brine) from the 
Reynolds Aquifer o f the Smackover Limestone Formation underlying Southern Union County, 
Arkansas. Albemarle Corporation, Great Lakes' principal domestic competitor conducts a similar 
operation in neighboring Columbia County. The brine produced from these wells contains 
commercially valuable concentrations of bromine, in the form of dissolved bromide salts. Water from 
the production wells is piped to bromine extraction plants where elemental bromine is removed, using 
a process which involves infusing hot brine with steam containing chlorine. Both companies then 
either sell the elemental bromine or use it to manufacture other products which the companies
20and its subsidiary, Arkansas Chemicals, Inc.
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market.21 After the brine is processed to remove bromine, it is transported to disposal wells where 
it is reinjected back into the Smackover formation.22 This combination o f production and reinjection 
acts as a pressure maintenance system which has the effect o f gradually sweeping high bromine brine 
away from injection wells toward production wells. Ultimately, “break through” will occur, and 
production wells will experience declines in bromide concentration, signaling the fact that they have 
begun to produce some o f the reinjected “tail-brine.” Since fluids move within the reservoir toward 
areas o f relatively lower pressure all injected brine does not flow directly from injection wells toward 
production wells. Moreover, some o f the brine which flows to production wells comes from 
directions other than that o f the injection wells. Finally, the Smackover Formation is a geologically 
complex morass o f interconnected porosity bars which are impossible to correlate over a large area.
These operations cover many thousand acres. While brine producers have long attempted to 
obtain leases authorizing their activities, some landowners simply refuse to lease. Is a brine producer 
liable to such an unleased owner on a theory such as trespass?
In 1979 the Arkansas Legislature enacted A.C.A. §15-76-301 et. seq., authorizing the AOGC 
to form brine production units and integrate the interests o f unleased owners therein. These units are 
required to  contain at least 1,280 acres, underlain by a common aquifer. The brine producer is 
jurisdictionally required to control at least 75% of the acreage within its proposed unit.
This statute went virtually unused23 until 1995 when Great Lakes, realizing a need to expand
21These products include flame retardant additives for plastics, agricultural pesticides, 
swimming pool water purifiers, photographic chemicals and pharmaceutical chemicals.
22Such reinjection is required by both EPA and AOGC.
23Albemarle's predecessor, Ethyl Corporation, did form two early brine units but neither 
involved injection wells.
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its brine operations, began to unitize. Ultimately three units were formed,24 over the opposition of 
Deltic Farm & Timber Co., Inc., then a subsidiary o f Murphy Oil Corporation. Deltic owned several 
thousand acres which were leased to Great Lakes as well as several thousand unleased acres. Deltic 
challenged all three unitization orders in petitions for review filed in Union County Circuit court 
contending, among other things, that the unitization statute was unconstitutional. While these 
disputes were pending, Deltic sued Great Lakes in United States District Court.25
Deltic's Federal Court complaint alleges trespass and several trespass-equivalents. It also 
contained a prayer for cancellation o f existing Deltic-to-Great Lakes leases.26 The District Court 
granted Great Lakes' motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the lease-cancellation counts 
of the complaint.
Next, Great Lakes moved for partial summary judgment that Deltic's damages were limited 
by the Statute of Limitations27 to those suffered within three years immediately preceding the filing 
of its complaint. Deltic claimed that it had just learned of Great Lakes' alleged violations o f its lands 
and that it was entitled to the benefit o f the so-called “discovery rule,” which tolls limitations until 
the victim knew or reasonably should have known it was being wronged. The District Court agreed 
with Great Lakes. It rejected the idea that the discovery rule should apply and found, alternatively, 
that Deltic should have discovered its alleged cause of action anyway.
24BUl-95 (South Plant Unit); BU2-95 (Central Unit); BU3-95 (West Plant Unit).
25Deltic Farm & Timber Co., Inc. v. Great Lakes Chemical Corporation.
26Deltic's admitted purpose was to reduce Great Lakes' leasehold acreage within its West 
Plant Unit and thus prevent Great Lakes from securing the jurisdictionally required 75%.
27A.C.A. §16-56-105.
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Deltic obtained leave of the Eighth Circuit Court o f Appeals to take an unusual interlocutory 
appeal o f the District Court's ruling on limitations. Then the Eighth Circuit Court affirmed the 
District Court, holding, as a matter o f law, that Arkansas would not apply the discovery rule in a 
mineral trespass case.28
After three more Great Lakes' partial summary judgment motions were granted in part and 
denied in part, the case was tried to the District Court, sitting without a jury, in December, 1997. As 
o f the submission deadline for this paper, the case remains under advisement, but a decision is 
expected soon. An appeal, if not appeal and cross-appeal, is virtually inevitable. A lot of money is 
involved. Also involved are several important issues o f natural resources law:
Does  the  Owne r  o f  a  Me r e  Leaseho ld  In ter es t  
Ha v e  a  Right  to  Sue  for  Mineral  Tr e s pa s s ?
In Budd v. Ethyl Corporation29 the Arkansas Supreme Court, citing Osborn v. Arkansas
Territorial Oil Gas Co.,30 refused to permit a brine lease owner to maintain an action for trespass:
We think the chancellor was right in rejecting that contention. Here the issue turns 
upon the limited nature of a lessee's property rights, prior to his attainment of 
production. Quoting again from the Osborn case, supra: “A gas lease, such as is 
involved in this case, is a contract granting to the lessee the right to explore the land 
and to produce therefrom the gas therein discovered. It is not a present sale or 
transfer o f title to the gas, but, on account o f its vagrant nature, the gas does not 
become actually owned until actually possessed. As is said in the case of Williamson 
v. Jones. 39 W. Va. 231: 'The title is dependent on finding the gas by the purchaser 
in a limited time' and is inchoate.” That thought was echoed in Pasteur v. Niswanger.
226 Ark. 486, 290 S.W.2d 852 (1956): “Our court has held that an oil and gas lease 
conveys an interest and easement in land itself, but no title passes until the oil and gas
28Deltic Farm & Timber Co., Inc. v. Great Lakes Chemical Corporation. ____ F.3d
(8th Cir. 1997).
29251 Ark. 639, 474 S.W.2d 411 (1971).
3O103 Ark. 175, 146 S.W. 122 (1912).
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are reduced to possession.”31
Deltic argued, however, that the Arkansas Supreme Court had changed this rule by dicta in 
its opinion in Hillard v. Stephens Production Company32 to the effect that the lessee o f natural gas 
obtains ownership o f gas in place. That dicta is clearly contrary to all other Arkansas law on this 
issue. The District Court has ruled in favor o f Great Lakes, limiting Deltic's claims to lands upon 
which it held a fee interest.
To What  Extent  Do e s  the  Rule  o f  Captu re  Permit  
Cap tu re  Fro m  and  Dis placement  Off  of  Unleased  La n d s ?
Arkansas' first “brine drainage” case was Budd v. Ethyl Corporation.33 Budd had sued Ethyl 
for damages he allegedly sustained from Ethyl's production of brine displaced from his unleased lands. 
Budd owned minerals under 240 acres lying adjacent to, but outside of, the boundaries o f Ethyl's 
recycling area, which consisted o f production wells surrounded by a circle o f injection wells. Budd 
sued Ethyl, asserting that Ethyl's recycling operation was unlawfully pushing bromine-rich brine off 
o f his property, thereby causing him injury.
Relying on the rule of capture, the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected Budd’s contention that 
the displacement of brine from beneath this tract of land by Ethyl's recovery process gave rise to a 
cause o f action. In response to Budd's argument that he should be compensated for minerals 
displaced from underneath this nearby tract o f land, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated:
The complaint describes the appellees' recycling operation in substance as follows:
The appellees have oil-gas-and-mineral leases upon a compact block o f about 16,000
31Budd v. Ethyl Corporation, supra, 251 Ark. at 641-642.
32Hillard v. Stephens Production Co., 276 Ark. 545, 637 S.W.2d 581 (1982).
33supra.
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acres of land. They have a number o f input wells in what is roughly a circle near the 
outer edge o f the block. They have a number o f output wells within that circle. The 
appellees withdraw salt water from the inner wells, extract therefrom valuable 
minerals (one o f which, according to the briefs, is bromine), and then forcibly inject 
the salt water into the input wells, which presumably facilitates the further withdrawal 
o f salt water from the output wells.
The appellant asserts the invasion o f two separate property interests, which must be 
discussed separately.
First, the appellant owns an undivided one thirty-sixth interest in the minerals in 240 
acres lying next to, but outside of, the appellees' 16,000-acre block. The appellees do 
not have a lease upon the 240 acres in question. The appellant asserts that the 
recycling operation is actually draining salt water from the 240 acres and that the 
appellees should be made to account to him for his share of the minerals that are being 
extracted from the salt water.
That argument is refuted by the law o f capture, which we hold to be applicable in this 
situation. That law was stated in our early case o f Osborn v. Ark. Territorial Oil &
Gas Co., 103 Ark. 175, 146 S.W. 122 (1912):
Petroleum, gas and oil are substances of a peculiar character * * *.
They belong to the owner of land, and are part of it so long as they are 
part o f it or in it or subject to his control; but when they escape and 
go into other land or come under another's control, the title o f the 
former owner is gone. If an adjoining owner drills his own land and 
taps a deposit o f oil or gas extending under his neighbor's field, so that 
it comes into his well, it becomes his property.
[Quoting Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 15 S.Ct. 245, 39 L.Ed. 304 (1895).]
Later cases are to the same effect.
The Arkansas Supreme Court thus concluded “that the law of capture prevents the [plaintiff] 
from maintaining his first asserted cause o f action” for minerals drained from his land lying adjacent 
to, but outside of, the periphery of Ethyl's recycling area.
The second reported “brine drainage” case was a diversity case decided by the Eighth Circuit
15
Court o f Appeals, Young v. Ethyl Corporation.34 Young sued Ethyl for damages it allegedly caused 
as a result o f its recycling operations. In contrast to Budd’s land, Young’s land was situated in the 
recycling area, directly between Ethyl's injection and production wells.
Specifically, Ethyl operated two production wells adjacent to the north and east o f the 
Young’s land, a production well located immediately to the north and west o f Young’s land, and an 
injection well located adjacent to and south o f Young’s land. It was undisputed that the injection 
o f debrominated waters into the injection well south o f Young’s land recycled the brine in the 
formation underlying Young’s land, forcing it to move to, and be recovered by, Ethyl’s production 
wells located northeast and northwest o f Young’s land.
Relying on the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Budd. the District Court had held 
that the rule o f capture precluded Young’s action against Ethyl. In reversing the district court's 
decision, the Court of Appeals held that there were significant factual distinctions between Budd and 
Young. In distinguishing these two cases, the Court o f Appeals compared exactly where each 
particular tract of land was situated in relation to Ethyl's recycling area. The Court o f Appeals 
distinguished the holding in Budd because Budd’s land was adjacent to, but outside of  Ethyl's 
recycling area, whereas Young’s land was located directly within Ethyl's recovery area. The court 
stated:
In Budd. the plaintiff sought an accounting for bromides removed from beneath two 
nonadjacent tracts o f land. The Arkansas Supreme Court treated the two tracts 
separately, dismissing the cause o f action as to each tract for different reasons. The 
first tract considered by the court was a 240-acre tract in which Budd owned an 
undivided interest in the minerals. The court found that this 240-acre tract was 
outside of the recycling area, although adjacent to it. Relying on the rule o f capture, 
the court rejected Budd's contention that the drainage o f valuable minerals from
34521 F.2d 771 at 772, 773 (8th Cir. 1975).
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beneath the tract stated a cause of action....
Since Young's tract is within the recycling area, the state court's disposition of Budd's 
cause o f action with respect to the 240-acre tract is not controlling.35
The Eighth Circuit Court o f Appeals in Young thus took great pains to preserve the holding
o f the Budd decision. The court made it clear that its decision only applied to those lands that lie
within the recycling area, i.e., the area between the injection and production wells.
The third reported “brine drainage” case is the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Jameson
v. Ethyl Corporation.36 Ethyl had sued Jameson for declaratory judgment, seeking to establish the
legality o f its operations pursuant to the rule o f capture. Jameson counterclaimed for damages and
requested injunctive restraint o f Ethyl's operations. Jameson's land was located within the area
between Ethyl's injection wells and production wells. Ruling that the Arkansas Supreme Court's
decision in Budd expressed the controlling law, the chancery court determined that the rule of capture
was applicable to Ethyl's operations and, accordingly, dismissed Mrs. Jameson's counterclaim.
On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the Budd decision was inapplicable to the
facts presented by Mrs. Jameson. The court stated:
In Budd v. Ethyl Corporation, supra, this Court had occasion to address the issue of 
whether Ethyl's operations in the Field which forcibly injected brine into input 
(injection) wells were entitled to the benefit o f the rule o f capture. As to a 240-acre 
tract lying next to but outside o f Ethyl's 15,000 area block, this Court held that the 
rule of capture applied and that Ethyl was not obligated to account for any minerals 
which may have flowed as a result thereof into its wells from the 240-acre tract. 
However, as to a 40-acre tract lying within Ethyl's peripheral area o f input (injection) 
wells, this Court concluded that a separate analysis was necessary. Because o f the 
limited nature o f the lessee's interest in the 40-acre tract within Ethyl's peripheral area 
of input wells and certain equities noted, this Court also rejected Budd's claim against
35Young v. Ethyl Corporation, supra, at 772-73 (emphasis added).
36271 Ark. 621, 609 S.W.2d 346 (1980).
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Ethyl concerning the 40-acre tract. Obviously, this Court would not have treated the 
encircled 40-acre tract differently if this Court had reached the decision in the Budd 
case that it was immaterial whether the lands were inside or outside of Ethyl's 
peripheral area of input wells.37
Thus, the Jameson decision preserved the holding in Budd that the rule o f capture precluded recovery 
for alleged injury to lands lying next to, but outside of \ the recycling area.
The District Court denied Great Lakes' motion for partial summary judgment limiting Deltic's 
recovery to damages suffered by Deltic on lands within the recycling area defined by Great Lakes' 
consulting engineer in his affidavit. The Court agreed with Deltic that the extent o f the actionable 
area was a question of fact to be determined from the evidence. The matter is under advisement.
Is an  AOGC Order  Form ing  a  Prod uction  Uni t  a  Re s  Ju d ic a t a  
Bar  to  an  Act io n  f or  Inj ur y  to  Lan ds  Outside  the  Un i t ?
Deltic claimed that Great Lakes' operations have damaged its lands even lying outside Great
Lakes' units. Copies of the orders of the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission, finding specifically that
Great Lakes' operations are contained within those units were offered into evidence at the trial.
Indeed, the order which formed the West Plant Unit expressly rejected Deltic's request to include
additional lands within that unit, finding that those lands had not been affected and were not in
imminent danger of being affected in the future. Under Arkansas law those unitization orders can be
res judicata bars to similar claims.38
The District Court refused to bar such Deltic claims on the basis of res judicata, but, when 
Deltic failed to produce evidence o f any such injury, the matter became moot.
37Jameson v. Ethyl, supra. 271 Ark. at 627-28 (emphasis added).
38Katter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 765 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1985).
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Wha t  is  t h e  Pr o pe r  Mea sur e  of  Da ma ge s  for  Wil lf u l  Mine ra l  Tr e s pa s s ?
Young v. Ethyl was the subject o f two appeals to the Eighth Circuit. The first, discussed 
above, dealt with Ethyl's liability to Young. Upon remand o f the Young case, the District Court 
assessed damages. In so doing, the District Court found that Ethyl had relied in good faith upon its 
belief that the rule o f capture protected it from liability. As a consequence, the District Court held 
that Ethyl had committed a trespass upon Young's land, but that that trespass was an innocent 
trespass, as opposed to a bad faith trespass. The District Court then proceeded to erroneously award 
to Young the value of all o f the products which Ethyl had produced from the bromine within the brine 
removed from Young's land.
The Eighth Circuit Court o f Appeals reversed again.39 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the 
District Court's holding that Ethyl's trespass was not in bad faith. However, it reversed the District 
Court's ruling that damages should be based upon bromine and secondary and tertiary bromine 
products. Instead, the Court o f Appeals specifically held that brine is a mineral under Arkansas law 
and that the measure o f damages for a good faith trespass to brine must be based upon the value of 
the brine in the ground. The value of brine in the ground can be measured either by taking their value 
at the well head and subtracting the costs of extracting them or, if the court determines that the victim 
o f the trespass would not have been a participant in the well, then a fair royalty.
Great Lakes contends that it acted in good faith. Deltic disputes that contention. All parties 
do appear to agree that the rule o f Young v. Ethyl discussed above sets the measure o f damages if 
the court finds Great Lakes to have acted in good faith. However, if Great Lakes is found to have 
acted in bad faith, Deltic contends that it is entitled to damages based upon the value o f elemental
39Young v. Ethyl, 581 F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1978).
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bromine rather than brine at the well head. Great Lakes, on the other hand, argues that even bad faith 
damages should be limited to those based upon the well head value o f brine without allowance for 
the cost of bringing the brine to the well head.
Great Lakes’ legal argument in this regard is based upon the following excerpt from the Eighth 
Circuit’s second Young opinion:
National Land and Arkansas Supreme Court cases indicate that if the taking is willful 
and in bad faith the measure o f damages if the value at the well head without 
deducting any costs of bringing the mineral to the surface. Thus even under the bad 
faith rule using the maximum surface value o f five cents per barrel, the total damages 
would approximate $380,000.40
Deltic contends that the above-quoted language was dicta because the Young appeal had 
involved a good faith trespass. The District Court denied Great Lakes' motion for partial summary 
judgment on this issue. The actual amount of damages, if any, is under advisement.
Deltic also contended that it was entitled to recover punitive damages in addition to bad faith 
damages. The trial court did grant Great Lakes' motion for partial summary judgment on that issue, 
holding that bad faith trespass damages were a form of punitive damages which precluded an award 
of additional punitive damages.
"Id. at 719.
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